Sun,
2007-09-16
H. L. D. Mahindapala
Part
I
Velupillai
Prabhakaran had reached the peak of his power by Christmas day
of 2004 – a turning point in his political career. He had
come along way from that fateful day in 1975 when he got his first
Tamil scalp by killing Alfred Duraiyappah, the mild-mannered Mayor
of Jaffna. On the way from 1975 to Christmas Day in 2004 he had
climbed over mountains of Tamil corpses to reach that peak. His
career in political crimes was rewarded by Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe who made him the uncrowned king of the north and
the east with his Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) signed on February
22, 2002.
Though
President Chandrika Kumaratunga was peeved that she was not consulted
about this hand over of the nation’s territory to Prabhakaran
she did nothing about it later after she dismissed him. Quickly,
she changed her tune and became the best guardian and protector
Prabhakaran. She was even prepared to go beyond CFA and legalize
the institutional structure -- the P-TOMS -- to make him the unchallenged
leader empowered to run the north and the east whichever way he
wants.
The
international community too had consented to go along with Wickremesinghe
and Kumaratunga and guarantee the territory and the powers donated
by and active Prime Minister and a more aggressive President.
But
hardly anyone noticed that this was also the period that was sending
out early warning signals to Prabhakaran. Bits and pieces of disparate
elements were coming together to undermine Prabhakaran’s
grip on events. For instance, it would have been most advantageous
to Prabhakaran if Kumaratunga’s moves to extend her period
in office got the nod from the Supreme Court. After she sacked
Wickremesinghe she was the last remaining hope of Prabhakaran
to get the infrastructure in place for power-sharing, with the
north and the east handed over to him exclusively. For Prabhakaran
to get that share of power Kumaratunga’s period had to be
extended. And to extend her power beyond prescribed limit Kumaratunga
had cooked up a story that she had not completed her legal term
in office. Her story was that she was entitled to an extension
because the first public swearing was not valid as she had a second
swearing privately.
When
this story, believed only by Kumaratunga and her coterie of yes-men,
went up to the Supreme Court it came crashing down like lead balloon.
Prabhakaran’s chances too were blighted with that decision.
With her or Wickremesinghe in power the chances were bright for
Prabhakaran to be confirmed not only as “the sole representative”
of the Tamils but also of Wickremesinghe and Kumaratunga.
Prabhakaran
had judged the mood of these two leaders correctly. The submissive
role of Wickremesinghe’s delegates, cowed down by his instructions
not to upset the Anton Balasingham and Erik Solheim – two
beans in the same anti-Sri Lankan pod – turned Balasingham
into the cock of the walk. Anton Balasingham was dictating where
the talks should beheld, when it should be held and what kind
of delegates should be in the government team etc.
And
the openly partisan role of Erik Solheim gave Balasingham and
Prabhakaran to be arrogant and intransigent. Prabhakaran was acting
as if he alone possessed the power to dictate terms to the Tamils,
to the south and to the international community. So he had no
reason to compromise. Imbued with notion that he was invincible
he was determined to go down his imaginary road to Eelam. His
calculation was that he could get what he wants through the only
mechanism that had lifted him from peninsular obscurity to fame
and power: the gun.
He
can’t be blamed for it because he had the President and
the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka like puttee in his hands. In his
calculations he had only a short distance to go to declare his
Eelam. He was preparing for his final assault to consolidate his
position by beating the Sri Lankan forces that were written off
as no-hopers by President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe.
After
Prabhakaran pushed Kumaratunga and Wickremesinghe into a corner,
Anton Balasingham, the Chief Negotiator of Tigers, was throwing
his weight around in Geneva crowing that they had the military
upper-hand to dictate terms to Wickremesinghe and Kumaratunga.
Earlier in the only public exposure of his leader at the Killinochchi
press conference, Balasingham told the media brazenly: “You
have your prime minister and we have our own!” That was
a direct insult to Wickremesinghe.
It
was also the time when Erik Solheim, the so-called peace facilitator,
was eating out of Balasingham’s hands. He too misread the
signs of the times and fell for the line sold by Balasingham about
the military balance being in favour of the Tamil Tigers. Of course,
this was true at the time because the Prime Minister and the President
of the nation were paralyzed from head downwards. This led Solheim
to operate on the mistaken notion that the Tigers were winning
and he had only to win Prabhakaran, through Balasingham to get
all the kudos he wants to be the exalted Norwegian peace-maker
who did the impossible. The naivety of international interventionists
and do-gooders was epitomized in the follies of Erik Solheim,
who, incidentally, was exposed by Karuna, the chief lieutenant
of Prabhakaran, as being in the pocket of the Tigers.
It
was a time of despair for the nation. Prime Minister, Wickremesinghe,
was kicking the forces in the butt for daring to go against his
wishes and defending the territorial integrity and national sovereignty.
He angrily pulled up the Navy Commander of the day for intercepting
a Tiger boat smuggling arms. His sole factotum, Badman Weerakoon,
was working overtime on the phone, providing all facilities for
the Tigers to get parts of their light aircraft and other military
hardware through the customs, all in the name of “confidence
building”.
In
short, Prabhakaran was dictating terms to Wickremesinghe from
Vanni and the Prime Minister was bending over backwards to appease
him in the name of (yes, that phrase again!) “confidence
building”. Chandrika Kumaratunga, who dismissed Wickremesinghe
from his three key ministries and took over complaining that Wickremesinghe,
was all out to beat Wickremesinghe in the game of appeasing Prabhakaran.
So she packed off her generals on overseas appointments or sidelined
them and teamed up with crafty yes-men to draw up the P-TOMS –
the draft of which was written by leading Tiger lawyers based
in Singapore and New York. She even imported Ram Manickalingam,
a Tiger in white verti, and parked him at the Peace Secretariat
headed by Jayantha Dhanapala who jointly proceeded to draft the
P-TOMS.
It
was the best of times for Prabhakaran. With everything going for
him, with his man sitting in the Prime Minister’s chair,
Prabhakaran was perched on the pinnacle of power. He was poised
to launch his final war to declare Eelam.
It
was at this point of time that the most unexpected happened. The
turning point came from the most unpredictable source –
about a thousand odd miles away. On Boxing Day, 2004, at 00:58:53
UTC (07:58:53 time in Sumatra) an undersea earthquake, with its
epicenter off the western coast of Sumatra, shook so violently
that it triggered the worst tsunami in recent memory. At 9.1 –
9.3 on the Richter scale it was the second largest ever recorded
on a seismograph. The force of that earthquake released waves
that moved imperceptibly below the surface until they leapt out
in mountainous waves and lashed, among the other coastal areas
in the Indian Ocean rim, the naval and military bases of Prabhakaran
in the eastern coast, mainly Mullativu. It is a day that Prabhakaran
will never forget.
Prabhakaran
was to lament later publicly, in his Heroes’ Day speech
about the devastation that blasted his hopes of launching his
final assault. He said on Sunday, November 27, 2005: “Faced
with the meaningless absurdity of living in the illusion of peace
we decided to resume our national liberation struggle. It was
at that conjuncture, during the latter part of last year, when
we were charting our action plan that the horrendous natural disaster
struck.
“Suddenly,
unexpectedly the tsunami waves struck at the villages and settlements
along the eastern coastal belt of our homeland causing an unprecedented
catastrophe. In this cataclysmic disaster unleashed by nature,
twenty thousand Tamil and Muslim people perished and about three
hundred thousand people lost their homes, properties and were
reduced to conditions of refugees. As nature inflicted further
calamity on the Tamil nation, which had already suffered monumental
destruction by war, our people were burdened with unbearable suffering,”
said Prabhakaran.
Reading
between the lines and, of course, the crocodile tears for the
Tamils, it is clear that he was mourning the colossal losses of
his bases, cadres and military hardware. Those who believed in
divine intervention read it as a sign of divine wrath visiting
Prabhakaran, at last. But Prabhakaran, who was made to believe
that, as Sun God, he was next to God, knew that not even his God/s
could help him to launch the massive offensive he was planning.
He knew that it had to be postponed for another day.
But
he was putting on a brave front. He said in his Heroes’
Day speech: “In these circumstances, our liberation movement
was geared to confront the crisis. Our fighting formations, as
well as our cadres belonging to various social and administrative
services, were immediately engaged in the tasks of relief and
rehabilitation.”
Diverting
his cadres to do social work when they were battle-ready to confront
the Sri Lankan forces was the last thing in his plans. But that
was his spin to a calamity that had crippled him. He believed
that he could ride over this disaster too. What he didn’t
realize then was that coming events were casting their shadows.
It was the beginning of a downward spiral that was going to land
him in the place where he is now: looking down at a precipice
while hanging from the branch of a tree that is cracking slowly
but steadily.
To
be precise the branch broke in March 2004 when his most trusted
and able commander, Karuna, parted company accusing the Jaffna
(northern) Tamils discriminating against the Batticoloa (eastern)
Tamils. When the tsunami hit Prabhakaran on top of Karuna’s
breakaway it was like the bull butting the man who fell from the
tree.
All
in all, the year 2004 was not auspicious for Prabhakaran. The
real shock to his system came from the epicenter in the western
coast of Sumatra on Boxing Day, 2004. The furious waves swept
20 miles deep into Mullativu, crashing into the military and naval
bases of Prabhakaran. Rumours began to circulate that Prabhakaran
was swept into a watery grave. But, as they say, only the good
die young. He was alive and kicking, mainly the Tamils into total
submission.
Then
came the Presidential elections in 2005. The Supreme Court had
kicked out Kumaratunga and the race was on between Wickremesinghe
and Mahinda Rajapakse. Those who are intrigued by the details
of history taking unpredictable turns and twists will, no doubt,
be mystified by the intricacies of this election. Though Mahinda
Rajapakse had the south in the palm of his hand Wickremesinghe,
his rival, had the Bandaranaikes on his side. Kumaratunga was
openly undercutting her own nominee. It was against party policy
but that didn’t bother her, or her brother, Anura. They
had cut a secret deal with Wickremesinghe to oust Mahinda Rajapakse
and stage a come back through the backdoor.
In
the field, however, the presidential candidates were fairly balanced
though Rajapakse had a slight edge in the south. The final outcome
depended on Prabhakaran who could tip the scales either way –
and he did. His decision was more devastating to him than the
Boxing Day tsunami. It changed the political landscape beyond
his wildest dreams. His decision to deny the Tamil people their
democratic right to vote boomeranged on him with a devastating
force. He thought he could twist the election to his advantage
by being neutral. But it was Prabhakaran’s biggest blunder
next to that of killing Rajiv Gandhi. He not only killed Wickremesinghe’s
chances of ever becoming a President but also his own chances
of achieving his Evil-lam.
Oblivious
of what was coming round the corner to hit him, Prabhakaran was
still performing like the master of all he surveyed on Heroes’
Day, November 27, 2005. He told the new President that he would
give him time to come up with the solution that would satisfy
him. But without any compunction he went for the Army Commander,
Lt.-Gen. Sarath Fonseka. Once again he missed his target. Then
he launched a series of attacks in Colombo. His fireworks were
exploding all over.
The
backlash came from abroad. Canada, which has the largest contingent
of Tamils settlers, (around 200,000 they claim) banned the Tigers
in March 2006. This was followed by the ban of the EU in May 2006.
This added up to 26 countries freezing the assets of the Tigers.
Tiger offices were raided and Tiger agents were arrested. Years
of labour put in by the Tamil diaspora were washed away by the
tsunami of violence unleashed by Prabhakaran. Killing, ethnic
cleansing, abducting children into his futile war, torturing dissenting
Tamils, committing war crimes and crimes against humanity were
his standard fare.
The
Tamil diaspora were forking out their hard earned money to finance
the killing, the torturing and the persecution of their own people
back home. Their hypocrisy was and is unlimited. They pretended
that they were contributing to the welfare of their folks oppressed
by the Sinhala-Buddhist government when they knew that the money
was channeled to oil the killing machine of Prabhakaran. The Tamil
doctors, lawyers, academics, churchmen and other professionals
and non-professionals were the criminals who were passing the
ammunition praising their lord, Prabhakaran.
But
the 200 – 300 million dollars sent annually to fill the
war chest of Prabhakaran (Jane’s Weekly) were not yielding
the results they expected. Prabhakaran was lurching from one disaster
to another. He had been found guilty by the Scandinavian peace
monitors of violating 98% of the terms and conditions of the CFA
– an international agreement which had virtually enthroned
him in the north and the east. Obsessed with his political delusions,
he was misleading the Tamils promising to take them to the next
step: his elusive Eelam. The more pragmatic and knowledgeable
Tamils knew from day one that it was not attainable because the
international community, and India in particular, were not going
to grant the Tamil separatists their dreamland.
When
Appapillai Amirthalingam, who went round the world with a diplomatic
passport as the Leader of the Opposition in the Sinhala-dominated
government, he discovered that the world was not going to grant
them the separate state. Earlier N. Shanmuganathan, the Tamil
Communist leader (Maoist wing) and a pioneering communist of the
Stalinist mould, had argued that the Tamils were not a nation,
according to Stalin’s Marxist-Leninist definition, he said.
But
the myths concocted by the Tamil elite in the fifties prevailed.
They pretended to be Gandhians – Gandhians who had no qualms
about distributing wooden pistols to their satyagrahins, as told
by Prof. A. J. Wilson, the son-in-law of S. J. V. Chelvanayakam,
the father of Tamil separatism. Prabhakaran is the political child
that came out of the mono-ethnic politics spawned by the vellahla
elite who were driven by the insane notion that they were born
to rule the Sinhalese, the Muslims and low-caste Tamils.
No
other force has destroyed the Tamils, their institutions, their
way of life as this ideology of vellahlaism. Ironically, the first
to pay for this ideology were the vellahlahs. When power changed
hands the low-caste Tigers got them, one by one. And even after
Tamil society has gone to pieces, under the forces violence unleashed
by the vellahla ideology -- the vellahla regime was always violent,
oppressive and consistently persecuting the low-caste Tamils from
feudal times -- the Tamils and their intellectuals have refused
to look behind their cadjan curtain introspectively.
To
cover up their historical sins against their own people, the elitist
Tamils of Jaffna, the most privileged community in Sri Lanka,
concocted the theory of being victims of the Sinhala-Buddhist
majority. They reveled in victimology, playing the role of the
underdog, and accusing the majority Sinhalese of discrimination
and oppression. NGO pundits and the Tamil propagandists blamed
the Sinhala-Buddhist even for the brutal violence of Prabhakaran.
This excuse would have had some validity if Prabhakaran’s
retaliatory violence was directed only at the Sinhalese. But what
had the Sinhalese done to Prabhakaran for him to kill the Muslims?
Or to ethnically cleanse them from Jaffna, after looting their
property and raping their women? Did the Sinhalese ask him to
abduct Tamil children from the desperate mothers who have no place
to hide their children? Is he running torture camps in the Vanni
to punish the Sinhalese? Did he kill Rajiv Gandhi because he wanted
to teach the Sinhala-Buddhists a lesson? Etc., etc.
The
hard reality is that Prabhakaran has lost the rationale on which
he was acclaimed initially as everybody’s “Thambi”
and survived later as “the sole representative of the Tamils”.
He has lost his sense of direction, lost the plot and lost the
goodwill of the reasonable Tamils yearning for peace which they
know will never dawn as long as they continue to manufacture excuse
to prop him up.
To
be continued
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