Problems with the Ceasefire Agreement were clearly described in 2002 by Lakshman Kadirgamar, the former Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, whose assassination by the LTTE was perhaps the most obvious indication of the contumely with which the LTTE regarded the CFA. Though we cannot expect all Foreign Ministers to be as learned and logical as Mr Kadirgamar, the statement of the Nordic conglomeration would have benefited from at least some awareness of the contents of Mr Kadirgamar's analysis. We therefore urge at least the current advisers to the relevant Ministers to study that document.

The Ministers, in their historical pronouncement, claim that as many as 10,000 lives may have been spared by the Agreement. Whilst the logic of this claim is dubious, it also shows signs of ignorance of the rulings of the originally fully Nordic Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission, as well as the concerted attacks conducted by the LTTE while the CFA was supposed to be in operation. Sadly, no Nordic conglomeration saw fit to make any statement when, in August 2006, the LTTE engaged in flagrant violation of the CFA through two massive military assaults that went far beyond the 3000 odd individual cases of CFA violation that the SLMM had previously recorded.

As conspicuous was the deafening silence from Valhalla when the LTTE summarily rejected Nordic monitors from countries belonging to the European Union. It even escaped the SLMM itself that this was a flagrant violation of Article 3.5 of the CFA, though the SLMM subsequently made it clear that it had to curtail its operations. The Nordic conglomeration that now expresses concern about 'an important mechanism that protected civilians' were scrupulously silent for a year and longer about the restrictions on that mechanism that the LTTE had imposed and which they so pusillanimously accepted.

Despite such violations, the Sri Lankan government strove to abide by the Ceasefire for over five long years. When President Kumaratunga resumed the reins of government in 2004, she continued in all good faith to indulge the LTTE, with financial and other assistance. After President Rajapakse took over, despite continuing attacks by the LTTE, GOSL refrained from retaliatory action for several months, until the threat became so intense that resistance was essential.

The continuing good faith of GOSL received no plaudits from Scandinavia. Continuing acts of terror by the LTTE received no criticism. It was only after repeated requests from the Peace Secretariat that the SLMM finally noticed in its weekly reports the forced conscription that Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar described when he debriefed GOSL after his last visit to Kilinochchi.

Nordic worries about possible increases in violence and human suffering could well have been expressed earlier, and it is sad that they emerge only in the context of criticism of the Government.

Finally, it is not only the Nordic countries that believe that only a political solution can address the grievances of all ethnic groups in the country to provide a sustainable peace. This is the belief of the Government, and it would be well if those who sincerely believed this amongst the international community provided support to those in the Government who have made this a priority.

Though the battle against terrorism, as the international community has recognized, cannot be relaxed, simultaneously the Government is aware that it must move to a political solution to political problems, and assistance for this would be welcome. Instead therefore of indulging in polarizing pronouncements, we urge Nordic Ministers interested in the welfare of all Sri Lankans to assist both in confidence building measures amongst all ethnic groups in the country, and in promoting a sustainable peace through discussions and democratic practices that will ensure peaceful development for all.